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ARGUMENT
The State Ignores Important Language in Section 602(a)(24)
At pages 16-18 of its brief, the State asserts that the plain
language of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(24) supports its position.

The

State reaches this conclusion, however, by focusing exclusively on
a dictionary definition of the words "receive" and "received" while
refusing to consider the language of section 602(a)(24) in its
entirety. The State ignores the fact that the section is concerned
with

"the

period

(Emphasis added)

for

which

such

benefits

are

received..."

Thus, it does not matter that the SSI benefits

were not paid until after the DIB was paid, since the SSI was for
the period of time starting in July 1992 when Nelson became
eligible. The period for which SSI benefits were received overlaps
the time when the DIB benefits were paid, thereby excluding Nelson
from the AFDC household.
By narrowing its focus to dictionary definitions, the State is
able to avoid facing the unfairness of its position.

In her

opening brief, Nelson pointed out that the cancellation of her
son's eligibility for AFDC and Medicaid was purely the result of
the infortuitous arrival of Nelson's DIB check before the SSI
benefit was calculated.

The State does not address the fact that

other similarly situated children whose mother's become disabled
are allowed to continue receiving financial and health benefits,
simply because the SSI check arrives first. It is this fundamental
unfairness that prompted the court in Gleim v. Com. Dept. of Public
Welfare, 409 A. 2d 951 (Pa. Cmwlth 1980) to reach the decision it
1

did,

a

decision which

"tortured reasoning."

the

State

characterizes

as

Brief of the Appellee, at 20.

employing
It is not

tortured reasoning to recognize the illogical and inconsistent
results that follow from the narrow approach taken by the State.
Nelson's Argument Does Not Conflict With Congressional and Agency
Policy
Starting at page 18 of its brief, the State argues that to
hold for Nelson and her son would be inconsistent with acceptable
Congressional and agency objectives and policy concerns.

The

trouble with the State's argument is that it never points to any
clear congressional or agency policy addressing the particular
facts

of

this

case.

After

discounting

Gleim

as

"tortured

reasoning," the State reviews Pennsylvania v. United States. 752
F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1984), a case which addresses a distinctly
different issue in the interplay between AFDC and SSI. Moreover,
the

State

ignores

Pennsylvania

v.

the

important

United

States

statement
that

the

by

the

district

court

in

court's

interpretation of section 602(a)(24) was only one possible reading
of the statute.

See discussion in Brief of Appellant, at 17-18.

The State further errs in asserting that Nelson's position
"carried to its logical extreme" would result in SSI applicants
being declared ineligible for AFDC during the SSI determination
period.

The mere filing of an SSI application does not render an

AFDC recipient ineligible. After all, the SSI disability claim may
be denied.

Once the AFDC recipient is found eligible for SSI, any

AFDC benefits received during the determination period are offset
against SSI benefits owed.

The State's suggestion at page 22 of
2

its brief that a finding in Nelson's favor would mean that the
State "may have to assume that an SSI applicant is also a recipient
and

thus

ineligible

for

AFDC

period..." makes no sense.

during

the

SSI

determination

The problem posed by the State is

already addressed under current law.
The concluding line at page 22 that the State's position
"furthers the Congressional intent to prevent an individual from
benefitting from both the SSI and AFDC programs simultaneously..."
reveals the confusion in the State's argument.

The line is

directly contradicted by the State's explanation of DIB and SSI
benefits earlier in its brief where it declares:
If an applicant is subsequently determined
eligible for SSI benefits, the SSA deducts
from its initial retroactive lump-sump [sic]
SSI payment an amount equal to the amount of
AFDC aid received by that individual during
the determination period. ... The rationale
for this deduction is to prevent a public
assistance recipient from benefitting from
both the SSI and the AFDC program for the same
period of time.
Brief of the Appellee, at 11.
The Secretary's Interpretation of Section 602(a)(24) Is Not
Entitled to Deference, Since It Arose From a Different Context
In her opening brief, Nelson pointed out that the Action
Transmittal relied on by the State as controlling policy did not
address the peculiar facts of this case.

It is an informally

created

issue

policy

intended

to

address

the

addressed

in

Pennsylvania v. United States. i.e., whether the federal government
could recoup all AFDC payments made to someone found eligible for
SSI benefits. It does not address the situation considered herein

3

that arises when a DIB check is arbitrarily issued before a
retroactive SSI check.

The State does not address that point but

argues, instead, that the court should defer without further
consideration to what the State regards as binding policy.
The State does acknowledge that a reviewing court need not
defer to an agency interpretation it finds unreasonable.

Having

said that, the State then declines to grapple with whether its
policy produced

a reasonable result in Nelson's

case.

The

appellant submits that it did not. While the Social Security Act
may be "among the most intricate ever drafted by Congress," its
complexity is not an excuse for the State to avoid the unfairness
of its policy.
CONCLUSION
Nelson presents to the court a rare case where circumstances
beyond her control resulted in her son losing both financial and
medical benefits for a year. She does not argue with Congress over
the wisdom of the lump sum policy, which often catches AFDC mothers
unaware.

She simply urges that the State has not offered a

persuasive argument for reading 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(24) in a way
that arbitrarily places her son in a worse position than other
similarly situated dependent children.
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